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INTRODUCTION 
Some parents are willing to drive across state lines in order to obtain 
cannabidiol-based medical marijuana oil. These parents end up illegally 
transporting the medical marijuana products back to their home state for 
their children.1 The act may involve committing a federal felony as the car, 
driven by desperate parents and full of marijuana oil, crosses state line 
after state line. Many of these stories come from parents whose children 
have severe epilepsy and have found no relief from traditional 
pharmaceuticals.2 
                                                     
* Seattle University School of Law, J.D. 2017. I would like to thank my fiancé Rob Shingleton for his 
unconditional support throughout this process. I would also like to thank the editors of the Seattle 
University Law Review for their contributions to the writing and editing of this article.   
 1. Kate Pickert, Pot Kids: Inside the Quasi-Legal, Science-Free World of Medical Marijuana for 
Children, TIME, http://time.com/pot-kids/ [https://perma.cc/A6AZ-NUPV]; see also Diane Tsai, One 
Family’s Illegal Journey to Get Medical Marijuana for Their Child, TIME (Nov. 4, 2014), 
http://time.com/3554936/medical-marijuana-kids-pot-kids/. 
 2. Tsai, supra note 1. One parent told Time that his daughter was having up to two hundred 
seizures per day until he and his wife started her on a medical marijuana regime; now her seizures are 
down to around thirty per day. Pickert, supra note 1. 
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The costs involved in these transactions far exceed the actual cost of 
the product. Because parents are purchasing medical marijuana from a 
nascent and often unregulated industry, transaction costs can include 
research time to determine which strains may be helpful; where those 
strains may be available; and travel time to get the product.3 One of the 
ways trademark law helps reduce these transaction costs in subsequent 
purchases is by allowing the consumer to know that once a particular 
product is found, that product will be of the same quality no matter which 
store—in the same or different state—it is purchased from.4 
However, consider this scenario: Parents have found that Brand X 
medical marijuana created by Company A—a well-known leader in 
producing high quality medical marijuana—has helped reduce the 
frequency of their child’s seizures. Yet, when the time comes to repurchase 
Brand X, it is unavailable from the parents’ regular store. The parents start 
researching online to see where else Brand X might be sold, but how will 
they know that it was created by Company A? Perhaps Company B, 
hoping to free ride off the goodwill of Company A, also calls its medicine 
for reducing the frequency of seizures Brand X and uses an identical or 
confusingly similar mark, even though Company B’s medical marijuana 
is of inferior quality. Will the consumers—the parents—be able to tell the 
difference? Or, will they simply recognize the logo and purchase an 
inferior product because they believe it is the same product as before? 
Trademarks are valuable because of their ability to act as a source 
indicator.5 The intrinsic value of a trademark comes as the company using 
the trademark builds goodwill.6 Goodwill is built by consumers’ trust in 
the brand and knowledge that the product behind the trademark will 
consistently be of the quality expected regardless of the point of sale. 
Consumers benefit from a company’s ability to protect this goodwill 
through enforcement of its trademark rights against infringers. One of the 
main benefits to consumers is a trademark’s ability to reduce transaction 
costs because there is no need to research each and every product 
                                                     
 3. Pickert, supra note 1. 
 4. One of the foundational principles of trademark law is that trademarks act as source indicators. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining a trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . to 
indicate the source of the goods”); see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:3 (4th ed. 2010). 
 5. See sources cited supra note 4 and accompanying text. See also Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC 
v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A trademark’s value is 
the saving in search costs made possible by the information that the trademark conveys about the 
quality of the trademark owner’s brand. . . . Once the reputation is created, the firm will obtain greater 
profits because repeat purchases and word-of-mouth endorsements will add to sales and because 
consumers will be willing to pay a higher price in exchange for a savings in search costs and an 
assurance of consistent quality.”). 
 6. See MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 2:19. 
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purchased; consumers can trust that the trademark used to identify the 
brand is only used to identify that specific brand.7 In trademark parlance, 
consumer confusion is reduced when companies can protect their 
trademarks.8 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) took 
concrete steps to reduce transaction costs to consumers purchasing 
medical marijuana products by creating a category for medical marijuana 
products within International Class 5.9 However, that decision was 
rescinded quickly.10 Then, the USPTO overreached its statutory authority 
by ordering a wholesale prohibition of federal registration for medical 
marijuana trademarks.11 This Comment argues that because the USPTO 
overreached its statutory authority in prohibiting federal registration for 
medical marijuana trademarks, it should reinstate the category for medical 
marijuana products and allow medical marijuana producers to seek federal 
registration of their trademarks. Part I provides an overview of the new 
category created for registering medical marijuana and its subsequent 
revocation. Part II is a statutory analysis of the Lanham Act12 and 
regulations to illustrate that the Lanham Act does not preclude registration 
of medical marijuana marks. It will also illustrate how the USPTO 
overreached its statutory authority by preventing registration of any 
                                                     
 7. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“In principle, 
trademark law . . . reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions . . . for 
it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by 
the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.” 
(internal citation omitted)); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 
(9th Cir. 1992) (“In economic terms, trademarks reduce consumer search costs by informing people 
that trademarked products come from the same source.”). 
 8. Cf. Kathleen Caulderwood, Marijuana Trademarks: Product Owners Struggle with Federal 
Trademarks, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014, 12:53 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/marijuana-
trademarks-product-owners-struggle-federal-trademarks-1697769 [https://perma.cc/C9RC-CJWL] 
(“We hear from our dispensary clients regularly that they have developed a new strain of marijuana 
only to have a competitor immediately copy it.”); Karl Herchenroeder, Aspen NORML Conference 
Addresses Trademarking Marijuana, ASPEN TIMES (June 3, 2014), http://www.aspentimes.com/news/ 
11624497-113/colorado-state-aspen-conference [https://perma.cc/Z9NY-K9KZ] (“The public needs 
to know, when it goes into a dispensary and it buys something, they need to know that they’re getting 
something that’s the same as what they could buy in another dispensary, another city or another 
state . . . .”). 
 9. The identification category allowed applications to indicate that they were registering 
“[p]rocessed plant matter for medicinal purposes, namely medical marijuana.” Kristen McCallion, In 
the Weeds: Trademark Protection for Medical Marijuana Products and Services, FISH & RICHARDSON 
(Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.fr.com/fishTMCopyrightblog/weeds-trademark-protection-medical-
marijuana-products-services/ [https://perma.cc/NG65-6KRH]. For more information about 
international classification categories, see Nice Classification, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (10th ed. 
2015), http://web2.wipo.int/classifications/nice/nicepub/en/fr/edition-20150101/taxonomy/ 
 [https://perma.cc/D8DR-7U9B]. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141(n) (2013). 
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trademarks associated with medical marijuana products. Part III continues 
by analyzing the inconsistencies in how the term “lawful” has been 
interpreted by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board and federal circuit 
courts. Finally, Part IV will address the alternatives to federal trademark 
registration and argue that the available alternatives are not adequate in the 
face of the rapid expansion of medical marijuana laws and policy 
throughout the country. 
I. FEDERAL PROHIBITION OF MARIJUANA TRADEMARKS 
For a few short months starting in April 2010, producers and 
processors of medical marijuana were given an opportunity to apply for 
federal registration of trademarks for the medical marijuana-based 
products they produced.13 The USPTO introduced a new category in 
International Class 5 specifically for medical marijuana;14 however, the 
registration window was quickly closed on the advice of the government’s 
lawyers.15 Because the registration window was short, there is little 
information as to why the category was introduced and then quickly 
removed. The USPTO simply announced that the introduction of the 
category was a mistake.16 During this time, the USPTO received numerous 
applications for registration of trademarks under this new designation,17 
but the agency did not grant registration to any of them. 
In addition to the category being removed, further prohibition is 
found in the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure18 (TMEP). The 
                                                     
 13. See McCallion, supra note 9; Ways of Consuming Medical Marijuana, UNITED PATIENTS 
GRP., http://www.unitedpatientsgroup.com/resources/methods-of-consumption [https://perma.cc/ 
C4QW-A9D8] (explaining that medical marijuana-based products include plant matter, extracted oil, 
edibles, transdermal patches, topicals, and many more). 
 14. See McCallion, supra note 9. 
 15. See Anne Glazer, Things to Keep in Mind When Marking Your Pot, LAW360 (Feb. 19, 2013, 
12:23 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/415339/things-to-keep-in-mind-when-marking-your-pot 
[https://perma.cc/XQ5B-HAJ2]; McCallion, supra note 9; Justin Scheck, Patent Office Raises High 
Hopes, Then Snuffs Them Out, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052748704682604575368783687129488. For an example of an application 
utilizing the new category, see U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86116528 (filed Nov. 12, 2013). 
 16. McCallion, supra note 9; Scheck, supra note 15; see also HUMBOLDT FARMS, Serial No. 
85029555, Paper Correspondence Outgoing (explaining that “the Office’s Acceptable Identification 
of Good and Services Manual (ID Manual) mistakenly included entries for certain medical marijuana-
related goods and services”) (on file with the author). 
 17. See Christopher R. McElwain, High Stakes: Marijuana Brands and the USPTO’s “[Lawful] 
Use” Registration Criterion, INTA BULL. 5 (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.inta.org/Academics/ 
Documents/2016/McElwain.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9BR-HG2T] (starting April 1, 2010, “the USPTO 
received 109 applications relating to marijuana”); Scheck, supra note 15. 
 18. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
(Jan. 2017) [hereinafter TMEP]. 
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TMEP was developed to aid examiners19 in evaluating trademark 
applications and contains self-made rules that are updated periodically by 
the agency.20 The manual is the only source of authority that explicitly 
prohibits federal registration for trademarks related to marijuana, medical 
or otherwise. The language of that prohibition has evolved significantly 
over the years. In July 2015, Section 907 of the TMEP specified that, 
“[r]egardless of state law, the federal law provides no exception . . . for 
marijuana for ‘medical use.’”21 By October 2015, the language of Section 
907 changed to state that “regardless of state law, marijuana and its 
psychoactive component, THC, remain Schedule I controlled substances 
under federal law and are subject to the [Controlled Substances Act]’s 
prohibitions.”22 This language persists through the most recent version of 
the TMEP dated January 2017.23 
II. TRADEMARK LAW’S STATUTORY BASIS & THE USPTO’S 
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY 
A. The Lanham Act & Federal Regulations 
United States trademark law is codified in the Lanham Act24 and 
related regulations. The laws are administered by the USPTO, an agency 
under the Department of Commerce.25 The Lanham Act created two 
federal trademark databases: the principal register26 and the supplemental 
register.27 The principal register is for trademarks “by which the goods of 
the applicant may be distinguished from the good of others.”28 In contrast, 
the supplemental register is for trademarks “capable of distinguishing 
applicant’s good or services, and not registrable on the principal 
                                                     
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a) (2013). An examiner may also be referred to as an “examining attorney.” 
See 37 C.F.R. § 2.37 (2013). 
 20. See TMEP, supra note 18, at Introduction. 
 21. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 907 (July 2015). 
 22. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 907 (Oct. 2015). 
 23. See TMEP, supra note 18, at § 907. 
 24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n. 
 25. See DOC Organizational Chart, DEP’T OF COM., https://www.commerce.gov/sites/ 
commerce.gov/files/media/files/2015/docorgchartfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/S795-4J3Z]. 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2013). 
 27. Id. § 1091 (2013). 
 28. Id. § 1052 (2013). 
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register.”29 The principal register, as the name implies, comprises the 
majority of federal trademarks.30 
Because the USPTO falls under the Department of Commerce, the 
foundational requirement for federal trademark registration is “use in 
commerce,” specifically interstate commerce.31 The Lanham Act defines 
“commerce” to mean “all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by 
Congress.”32 A plain language interpretation of this definition reveals 
ambiguity as to the meaning of what type of commerce may be regulated. 
Currently, the USPTO interprets this definition to mean that the commerce 
covered by the trademark must be lawful under federal law.33 Effectively, 
the USPTO has changed the language of the statute from “use in 
commerce” to “lawful use in commerce.”34 However, the USPTO has 
entertained the interpretation that commerce was not intended to mean 
lawful under federal law. In 1999, the USPTO amended the Code of 
Federal Regulations to eliminate the requirement that an applicant specify 
the type of commerce on which the trademark was used.35 Through the 
amendment process, the USPTO reasoned that the definition of 
“commerce” in Section 45 of the Act is “all commerce which may lawfully 
be regulated by Congress,” and “the Office will presume that an applicant 
who states that the mark is in use in commerce is stating that the mark is 
in use in a type of commerce that Congress can regulate.”36 This Comment 
argues that this latter interpretation—that commerce is all commerce that 
is within the authority of Congress to regulate under the Commerce 
Clause—is the proper statutory interpretation.37 
                                                     
 29. Id. § 109(a) (2013). 
 30. See Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, The United States Supplemental Register: 
Solace, Substance, or Just Extinct?, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 828, 832 (2013) (citing that as of 2013, 
“registrations on the supplemental register account for 3.9% of all registrations with the USPTO”). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)(3)(C), 1091(a) (2013). 
 32. Id. § 1127 (2013). 
 33. See, e.g., W. Worldwide Enters. Grp. Inc. v. Qinqdao Brewery, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1137, *4 
(T.T.A.B. 1990) (“The ‘lawful use’ in commerce doctrine is based solely upon the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office’s interpretation of the use in commerce requirement of the Act . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); Anthony L. Fletcher & David J. Kera, The Forty-Fourth Year of Administration of the 
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 601, 701 (1991) (“The lawful use-in-commerce 
doctrine, codified in the Trademark Rule 2.69, is based solely on the PTO’s interpretation of the use-
in-commerce requirements of the Trademark Act as requiring use in compliance with other acts of 
Congress.”). 
 34. See MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 19:124. 
 35. Specification of Type of Commerce No Longer Required, 64 Fed. Reg. 173 (proposed Sept. 
8, 1999) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 2). 
 36. Id. (emphasis added). 
 37. See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 
1997) (reading “[t]he history and text of the Lanham Act [to] show that ‘use in commerce’ reflects 
Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause, rather than to 
limit the Lanham Act to profit-seeking uses of a trademark”). See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
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The regulations promulgated by the USPTO to fill in the gaps of the 
Lanham Act reveal a similar ambiguity. Section 2.69 states that “[w]hen 
the sale . . . of any product for which registration of a trademark is sought 
is regulated under an Act of Congress, the [USPTO] may make appropriate 
inquiry as to compliance with such Act for the sole purpose of determining 
lawfulness of the commerce.”38 The USPTO has adopted the interpretation 
that this permissive regulation is in fact a mandatory regulation requiring 
that the product to which the trademark is affixed must be lawful under 
federal law.39 However, a plain language interpretation of this statute does 
not provide such clear requirement. 
The regulations form the basis of the TMEP. In fact, in the first two 
editions of the TMEP, the USPTO simply reprinted the regulations in 
many of the sections for examiners.40 The TMEP now provides, in addition 
to the regulatory language, greater explanation to examiners based on 
judicial changes to the statutory interpretation of the Lanham Act and 
regulations.41 This Comment will explore both the underlying regulatory 
authority and the TMEP. 
B. The USPTO’s Rulemaking Authority & Statutory Overreach 
The USPTO’s rulemaking authority is derived from Section 2 of 
Title 35 of the United States Code.42 This section “authorizes the Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office to establish regulations, not 
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the USPTO.”43 
The development of Section 2.69 described above is inconsistent with the 
statutory language of the Lanham Act, and its promulgation was an 
overreach of the USPTO’s rulemaking authority. 
Trademark law underwent a major revision with the passage of the 
1946 Lanham Act. Before the Lanham Act, trademark law was governed 
by the Trademark Act of 1905.44 In the 1905 Act, the statute provided for 
a bar on registration of trademarks “used in unlawful business.”45 
                                                     
U.S. 1 (2005) (for the proposition that Congress’s Commerce Clause authority extends even to 
intrastate cultivation of marijuana for personal use). 
 38. 37 C.F.R. § 2.69 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 39. See In re Morgan Brown, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350, 2 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (“Thus, any goods or 
services for which the mark is used must not be illegal under federal law.” (citations omitted)). 
 40. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURES (2d ed. 1993). 
 41. See TMEP, supra note 18, at Introduction. 
 42. 35 U.S.C. § 2. 
 43. TMEP, supra note 18Error! Bookmark not defined., at Introduction (emphasis added). 
 44. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, 33 Stat. 724. 
 45. Id. § 21; see also Iver P. Cooper, “Unclean Hands” and “Unlawful Use in Commerce”: 
Trademarks Adrift on the Regulatory Tide, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 38, 43 (1981). 
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Similarly, the 1938 federal regulations stated: “[N]o trade-mark will be 
registered which is used in unlawful business . . . .”46 These two very 
explicit prohibitions were not carried forward into the 1946 Act or 
regulations.47 The legislative history of the 1946 Act is extensive, and 
Congress spent a considerable amount of time crafting a carefully tailored 
statute that codified contemporary trademark practices.48 It can be 
reasoned that Congress was not concerned with trademarks for unlawful 
business if it did not use this language, or any language suggesting such a 
prohibition, in the original language of the 1946 Act.49 
In conjunction with the new trademark act, the USPTO submitted a 
notice of proposed rulemaking to revise the regulations in accordance with 
the language of the Lanham Act on April 25, 1947.50 The new regulations 
went into effect on July 5, 1947, and with them came the first instance of 
a requirement that a trademark comply with another federal statute. 
Section 100.141 required that applications for trademark registrations for 
products that required prior approval of the product’s label before being 
put into the stream of commerce be accompanied by the label and a 
certification from the designated government agency approving such 
label.51 This regulation applied to “cases specified by this section” and 
were enumerated within a schedule.52 The schedule in Section 100.141 
called out “meat products . . . which are subject to Federal inspection” and 
“[l]abels for wines . . . and for distilled alcoholic liquors.”53 
The rule was subsequently revised to be more encompassing by 
eliminating the specific schedule from the original 1947 version. In 1954, 
the USPTO submitted a notice of rulemaking to the Federal Register54 with 
a proposal to modify the regulations in a significant manner. The notice 
                                                     
 46. 37 C.F.R. § 5.19 (1938) (superseded by 37 C.F.R. § 100 (1947)). Section 100 was 
subsequently superseded in 1955. 37 C.F.R § 2 (1955). 
 47. See Cooper, supra note 45, at 55 (“First, in enacting the Lanham Act, Congress chose not to 
retain the ‘unlawful business’ provision of Section 21 of the Act of 1905.”). 
 48. See Chauncey P. Carter, Legislative History of the New Trade-Mark Act, 36 TRADEMARK 
REP. 121, 121–23 (1946) (citing legislative history spanning from the 68th Congress to the 79th 
Congress). 
 49. See NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2016) (“When the legislature uses a term or phrase in one 
statute . . . but excludes it from another, courts do not imply an intent to include the missing 
term . . . where the term or phrase is excluded.”). 
 50. 12 Fed. Reg. 2,810 (Apr. 30, 1947). 
 51. 37 C.F.R. § 100.141 (1947) (superseded by 37 C.F.R. § 2.69 (1955)); see also 12 Fed. Reg. 
3,956, 3,962 (June 19, 1947). Part of the new regulations included a complete supersedure of the 
original Part 5 trademark regulations; the new regulations were numbered using the Part 100 series. 
 52. 37 C.F.R. § 100.141 (1947) (superseded by 37 C.F.R. § 2.69 (1955)); see also 12 Fed. Reg. 
3,956, 3,962 (June 19, 1947). 
 53. 37 C.F.R. § 100.141 (1947) (superseded by 37 C.F.R. § 2.69 (1955)); see also 12 Fed. Reg. 
3,956, 3,962 (June 19, 1947). 
 54. 19 Fed. Reg. 5,357 (Aug. 21, 1954). 
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outlined all the changes that the USPTO wanted to make to regulations, 
including Section 100.141. The proposed regulation called out “meat 
products” in a parenthetical as an example of products that may require 
prior governmental approval, but it also retained the requirement that the 
trademark owner submit in the application “a statement that the sale of the 
product, or products, in such commerce is authorized by the appropriate 
[government] agency.”55 At the end of the notice of rulemaking, the 
USPTO added the following language: “Other sections, including the 
forms, are also proposed to be amended to coordinate language and 
references with the amendments in the above listed sections which may be 
adopted and to make minor revisions in language; the arrangement and 
numbering of the sections are also proposed to be amended.”56 
The pivotal change in the regulations occurred in 1955 when the final 
regulations based on the 1954 notice were promulgated. The promulgated 
rules differed significantly from the proposed rules without an intervening 
notice being issued. In the final regulations, the USPTO replaced Section 
100 with Section 2.57 While many of the revisions were simply to the 
numbering of the section, other changes were more significant. During this 
rule change, the USPTO introduced the first instance of Section 2.69, 
which read: 
When the sale or transportation of any product for which registration 
of a trademark is sought is regulated under an Act of Congress, the 
Office may, before allowance, make appropriate inquiry as to 
compliance which such act for the sole purpose of determining 
lawfulness of the commerce recited in the application.58 
Many scholars believe that the new Section 2.69 is far broader than 
the original Section 100.141. Professor Thomas McCarthy, the preeminent 
authority on trademark law, posits that Section 2.69 raises the question: 
“[T]o what extent PTO Examiners should become ‘super-enforcers’ of the 
current plethora of federal regulatory statutes.”59 Another critic lamented 
that “the PTO’s enforcement of regulatory laws is entirely uncontemplated 
by Congress, beyond the competency of its personnel, arbitrary and 
capricious in nature, and beyond the stated intent of the Act.”60 This 
sentiment was echoed by contemporary scholars who believe that the rule 
                                                     
 55. Walter J. Derenberg, The Eighth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 
1946, 45 TRADE-MARK REP. 987, 991 (1955). 
 56. 19 Fed. Reg. 5,357, 5,361 (Aug. 21, 1954). 
 57. See 20 Fed. Reg. 4,797, 4,797 (July 7, 1955) (“Part 100 is abolished to be replaced by new 
Part 2 established herein.”). 
 58. Id. at 4803. 
 59. MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 19:124. 
 60. Cooper, supra note 45, at 55. 
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is “broader indeed than the rule which it replaces” and may be the “most 
far-reaching new rule.”61 
To lend more support to the argument that the statute does not 
contemplate the USPTO policing all federal statutes, in 1970, the 
Secretary of Commerce established the Public Advisory Committee 
(Committee) for Trademark Affairs to advise the USPTO on ways to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of trademark administration.62 
This comprehensive multi-year study reviewed the purpose of the 
trademark system, the functions of the USPTO, and the operations of the 
USPTO.63 The study focused on “selected aspects of the system which 
were considered to present the most serious problems from the view point 
of its public purposes.”64 The Committee provided the USPTO with more 
than 128 recommendations for improvement.65 In the 1978 report, the 
Committee recommended that the USPTO “should delete Trademark Rule 
2.69” because “the office should not concern itself with the policing of 
other statutes.”66 
Finally, as a policy matter, the USPTO’s own practices do not 
support the policy of prohibiting registration of trademarks used in 
commerce that may be in violation of federal law. In 2016, the Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board (Board) reiterated that examining attorneys are not 
necessarily looking to whether the underlying goods or services associated 
with a registration application are truly lawful under federal law.67 The 
Board stated: 
Generally, the USPTO presumes that an applicant’s use of a mark in 
commerce is lawful under federal law. Thus, registration generally 
will not be refused based on unlawful use in commerce unless either 
(1) a violation of federal law is indicated by the application record or 
other evidence, . . . or (2) when the applicant’s application-relevant 
activities involve a per se violation of a federal law.68 
                                                     
 61. Walter J. Derenberg, The Eighth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 
1946, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 987, 991–92 (1955); see also Trademark Comm. of the Patent Law Ass’n 
of Chi., Digest of Changes in New Trademark Rules, 38 J. PATENT OFF. SOC’Y 180, 187 (1956) (“The 
new rule is much broader but it is believed that the word ‘may’ mean that the Patent Office will use 
considerable discretion before investigating compliance with other governmental regulations.”). 
 62. Anthony R. DeSimone & Donald W. Banner, Report of the Public Advisory Committee for 
Trademark Affairs, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 660, 660 (1978). 
 63. See William E. Schuyler, Jr., Trademark Operations of the United States Patent Office, 61 
TRADEMARK REP. 151, 153 (1971). 
 64. Id. 
 65. DeSimone & Banner, supra note 62. 
 66. Id. at 664. 
 67. See In re Morgan Brown, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350 (T.T.A.B. 2016). 
 68. Id. at 3 (citations omitted) (first emphasis added). 
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Moreover, the Federal Circuit has made it clear that the role of the USPTO 
“is to protect owners of trademarks by allowing them to register their 
marks,” not to perform duties of the court.69 It does not follow that if the 
Lanham Act prohibited registration of trademarks associated with illegal 
products or services, the USPTO would presume that the underlying 
products or services were lawful. If Congress mandated such a prohibition, 
then the USPTO would likely have to devote more resources to 
investigating all underlying products or services for their compliance with 
any relevant law or regulation that may affect the product or service rather 
than relying on a presumption of lawfulness. 
III. INCONSISTENT USE & INTERPRETATION OF “LAWFUL” 
The term lawful is peppered throughout the Lanham Act. Through 
actions by the USPTO, the Board, and a few circuit courts, the meaning of 
lawful within the Lanham Act has been conflated and not consistently 
applied throughout the years. Basic tenants of statutory construction and 
interpretation dictate that when interpreting a statute, “each part or section 
should be construed in connection with every other part or section to 
produce a harmonious whole.”70 The inconsistent interpretation of lawful 
reinforces the proposition that Congress did not intend to require products 
to which marks are affixed to be lawful under federal law and that this 
prohibition was created by the USPTO contrary to the statutory language. 
The TMEP states that if “the mark itself or the identified goods or 
services violate federal law, registration must be refused under Trademark 
Act Sections 1 and 45, based on the absence of lawful use of the mark in 
commerce.”71 The cited authority for this requirement includes In re 
Stellar International, Inc.,72 and Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown.73 In 
each of these cases, the definitions of lawful and commerce were not 
consistently applied. 
One of the earliest cited authorities for the interpretation that use in 
commerce requires lawful use in commerce is In re Stellar International, 
Inc. In that case the applicant was denied registration because of the 
product’s label, which failed to list certain information as required by 
statute.74 The applicant asserted that Rule 2.69 “does not extend the scope 
of prohibitions to register [a mark] which are clearly spelled out in 
                                                     
 69. In re Four Seasons Hotel Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 70. NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:5 (7th ed. 2016). 
 71. TMEP, supra note 18, § 907. 
 72. 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 48 (T.T.A.B. 1968). 
 73. 823 F.2d 522 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 74. Thomas G. Field, Jr., The Fourth Dimension in Labeling: Trademark Consequences of an 
Improper Label—Part II, 25 FOOD DRUG COSM. LAW L.J. 372, 373 (1970). 
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Sections 1 and 2 of the [Lanham Act].”75 The applicant further argued that 
because “the mark was used on goods sold in commerce which may be 
lawfully regulated by Congress, the refusal of registration is not only 
improper but is not contemplated by Section 1 or Rule 2.69.”76 However, 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board rejected this argument stating that 
the applicant’s assertion was “illogical and incongruous.”77 While the 
Board acknowledged that there is “no reference to ‘lawful [use in] 
commerce’ in Section 1 of the [Lanham Act,]”78 it nevertheless concluded 
that it was “evident that the term ‘commerce’ whenever and wherever used 
in the trademark statute must necessarily refer to ‘lawful commerce.’”79 
This interpretation has carried on, albeit not consistently, for decades.80 
Four years later, the Board had the opportunity to construe the 
meaning of lawful as it was used in describing the requirements for 
registration on the supplemental register and the Board construed the term 
differently than it was used in In re Stellar International, Inc. In 
Kwik-Kopy Franchise Corp. v. Dimensional Lithographers, Inc.,81 the 
Board had to construe the term lawful in a way that reconciled the 
language used in the Lanham Act of 1946 with the language of the Act of 
1920.82 The Act of 1920 established the supplemental register and allowed 
“registration of matter that was merely capable of distinguishing goods 
and services.”83 The applicant “had to have made ‘bona fide’ use of its 
mark for at least a year.”84 In contrast, the Lanham Act permits registration 
to “[a]ll marks capable of distinguishing applicant’s goods or services and 
not registrable on the principal register . . . which are in lawful use in 
commerce by the owner . . . .”85 
In reconciling the differences between the Act of 1920 and the 
Lanham Act, the Board reasoned: “[T]he corresponding provision of the 
two statutes must be similarly construed. Since ‘bona fide’ has been 
consistently interpreted [in the Act of 1920] to mean ‘exclusive,’ the term 
                                                     
 75. In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at *2. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. As described in Christopher McElwain’s article, the USPTO uses In re Stellar as the basis 
for justifying any denial of registration for lawful reasons. See McElwain, supra note 17, at pt. III.A 
(“In general, when they provide any justification for the Lawful Use Rule beyond noting that ‘it is 
settled,’ these decisions merely cite Stellar’s concern about creating an ‘anomaly.’” (internal footnote 
omitted)). 
 81. 173 U.S.P.Q. 378 (T.T.A.B. 1972). 
 82. Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 534. 
 83. LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 30, at 839. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (2002). 
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‘lawful’ in [the Lanham Act] must similarly be construed.”86 Thus, in an 
instance where Section 23 of the Lanham Act87 explicitly calls for lawful 
use, the Board has reasoned that the statute did not mean lawful in the 
ordinary sense of the word. 
Other instances of ambiguous uses of “lawful” occur in Section 2(d) 
of the Lanham Act governing concurrent registration.88 The USPTO has 
used Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown as a basis for denying federal 
registration for medical marijuana trademarks. The USPTO cites this case 
for the proposition that “[a] valid application cannot be filed at all for 
registration of a mark without ‘lawful use in commerce.’”89 However, this 
is not the end of the court’s sentence, and this cherry-picking of the 
opinion’s language misconstrues the court’s point. In Daffy Dan’s 
Bargaintown the applicant argued, based on precedent, that “by showing 
such use, his ‘entitlement’ to a concurrent use registration is established.”90 
In correcting the applicant’s interpretation of the precedent, the court 
stated: “In Beatrice Foods, the court spoke of the requirement for an 
applicant’s lawful use in commerce outside of the conflicting claimant’s 
area as being ‘jurisdictional in nature.’”91 The court went on to finish the 
phrase cited by the USPTO above,92 stating: 
A valid application cannot be filed at all for registration of a mark 
without ‘lawful use in commerce’ . . . where a claim is made of 
concurrent rights, such use must begin prior to the filing date of any 
application by a conflicting claimant to the mark. In this sense, the 
requirement is ‘jurisdictional.’93 
Ultimately, this case resolved based on an analysis of likelihood of 
confusion and nothing in the opinion suggested that the goods associated 
with the trademark necessarily violated any federal law. 
More ambiguity exists as to whether lawful within Section 2(d), 
governing concurrent use, means jurisdictional or in good faith. In Bright 
Beginnings, Inc. v. Care Committee, Inc., the court interpreted the term 
lawful, as applied to a junior user seeking concurrent registration, to mean 
                                                     
 86. Kwik-Kopy Franchise Corp., 173 U.S.P.Q. at *4. Cf. LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 30, at 
839 n.45 (citing Walter J. Derenber, The Third Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act 
of 1946, 40 TRADEMARK REPORTER 914, 923 (1950) (“I submit that the word ‘lawful’ in section 23 
of the 1946 Act should be construed to mean ‘substantially exclusive’ and that upon any proposed 
revision of the Lanham Act, these words should be substituted for ‘lawful.’”)). 
 87. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (2013). 
 88. Id. § 1052(d) (2013). Concurrent registration is permitted when it is determined the confusion 
will not occur from the use of similar marks by more than one person. See id. 
 89. Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d 522, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 90. Id. at 525–26 (relying on In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
 91. Id. at 525 (citing In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d at 473). 
 92. See note 89 and accompanying text. 
 93. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d at 526 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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that the junior user “must have adopted the mark in good faith.”94 This 
interpretation is consistent with the interpretation of lawful adopted by the 
Federal Circuit in Action Temporary Services, Inc. v. Labor Force, Inc.95 
In Labor Force, the court concluded that a user was a lawful user because 
the user did not have constructive notice of another user’s mark.96 In these 
cases the term lawful was interpreted to mean in good faith.97 
It was not until 2007 that the Ninth Circuit took up the issue of 
whether commerce inherently means commerce that is legal under federal 
law. In CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Sciences, Inc.,98 the court “agree[d] 
with the PTO’s policy and [held] that only lawful use in commerce can 
give rise to trademark priority.”99 The court reasoned that to “hold 
otherwise would be to put the government in the ‘anomalous position’ of 
extending the benefits of trademark protection to a seller based upon 
actions the seller took in violation of that government’s own laws.”100 In 
re Stellar International, Inc. was the cited authority for this reasoning, 
which was arbitrarily decided, as argued above.101 
These inconsistencies in the use of lawful within the Lanham Act 
support the conclusion that commerce, as used in the statute, does not 
inherently mean lawful commerce. As aptly stated by Christopher 
McElwain: “If ‘commerce’ always means ‘lawful commerce,’ then what 
does ‘lawful use in commerce’ mean when used in connection with 
concurrent use and the supplemental register? Does ‘lawful use in [lawful] 
commerce’ require an extra level of lawfulness?”102 The interpretation 
problem extends to more than a simple academic exercise in parsing a 
statute; the effects of this prohibition are significant. 
IV. BENEFITS OF FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION 
Under the USPTO’s current policy, trademarks identifying medical 
marijuana products and medical marijuana retail stores will be denied 
federal registration. Until recently, many intellectual property attorneys 
recommended applying for trademark registration for products that are 
                                                     
 94. Bright Beginnings, Inc. v. Care Comm., Inc., No. 93-1676, 1994 WL 237356, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 28, 1994). 
 95. 870 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 96. Labor Force, Inc., 870 F.2d at 1565–66; see also My Aching Back, Inc. v. Klugman, 6 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1892, 1988 WL 252501 at *2 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (holding that the applicant could not be 
considered a “lawful concurrent user” when “it had constructive notice of the use of [the] identical 
mark for virtually identical services by another party”). 
 97. LaLonde & Gilson, supra note 30, at 848 n.92. 
 98. 474 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 99. Id. at 630 (first emphasis added). 
 100. Id. (citing In re Stellar Int’l Inc., 159 U.S.P.Q. at 51). 
 101. See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text. 
 102. McElwain, supra note 17, at 21 (alteration in original) (internal footnote omitted). 
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similar to, but not necessarily used in conjunction with, marijuana plant 
matter.103 One attorney went as far as suggesting that an owner could 
create “a separately-owned business, apart from the marijuana dispensary 
business, that sells such products and services and have that business own 
the trademark.”104 This strategy is suitable only for those businesses that 
may have a separate business or non-marijuana products to which the 
trademark can attach and still be used correctly with medical marijuana 
products. 
However, in July 2016, the USPTO disallowed this practice. In a 
sweeping case marked as precedent for the USPTO,105 the Board denied 
registration for a trademark in international class 35 for “retail store 
services featuring herbs.”106 In this case, Morgan Brown, owner of a 
medical marijuana dispensary that also sold other herbs to consumers, 
sought registration for the trademark HERBAL ACCESS in connection 
with the store.107 The trademark was denied registration on the basis that 
it was used in connection with marijuana.108 The Board reasoned that if the 
trademark was granted registration, then the registration would broadly 
encompass all products that are classified as herbs, including marijuana.109 
Furthermore, the Board found it of no consequence that the trademark was 
also being used to identify products that were not subject to federal 
restriction or prohibition.110 This single finding will likely be used to 
prohibit registration of marks that are not used in connection with 
marijuana if the examining attorneys can find some link to the controlled 
substance. 
Absent federal registration, owners of medical marijuana trademarks 
can pursue common law trademark rights; state registration, where 
available; or federal registration of a mark unrelated to medical 
marijuana.111 However, these alternatives are inadequate in light of the 
rapid expansion of medical marijuana laws throughout the country. 
Trademark rights are granted by use and not exclusively by registration, 
but federal registration confers significantly more rights and privileges 
                                                     
 103. See, e.g., Caulderwood, supra note 8; Glazer, supra note 15; McCallion, supra note 9. 
 104. McCallion, supra note 9. 
 105. Not all cases are considered precedential decisions within the agency. See TRADEMARK 
TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 101.03 (June 2016). 
 106. In re Morgan Brown, 119 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350, 2016 WL 4140917 at *1 (T.T.A.B. 2016). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at *2. 
 109. Id. at *7–8. 
 110. Id. at *7 (“The mere fact that lawful use is also contemplated by the identification does not 
aid Applicant’s cause.”). 
 111. See discussion infra. 
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than an unregistered common law trademark.112 Common law trademark 
rights arise by use within a specific geographic area where the trademark 
is used in commerce, but those rights do not extend to areas in which the 
mark owner may extend business but has not yet done so.113 Common law 
rights are also limited to the specific use of the trademark.114 As a result, 
there is seldom a reliance on common law rights. 
State registration of a trademark offers more protection for the mark 
than common law rights but is significantly less advantageous than federal 
registration.115 One of the disadvantages is that owners of state-registered 
trademarks may not be able to assert their rights in federal district court.116 
This can lead to problems when policing the trademark online.117 Because 
a trademark may not be able to take advantage of the federal court system, 
the transaction costs associated with policing the mark, such as travelling 
to a distant forum for a lawsuit, may reduce the likelihood that an owner 
will seek redress for a violation of their intellectual property. The 
transaction costs are also increased to trademark owners, who must 
register their mark in each state in which they do business. 
In contrast to the state and common law systems, which may require 
the trademark owner to register separately in each jurisdiction it does 
business, federal registration permits the trademark owner to file one 
registration and receive nationwide protection. Federal registration also 
constitutes constructive use and grants nationwide priority to the 
trademark.118 This means that even if an owner has not yet entered a 
market, the trademark will still have priority in the market against most 
other users.119 
In addition to the discussion in this Comment about the lawfulness 
requirement, federal registration requires that a trademark be used in 
interstate commerce.120 Particularly important to medical marijuana 
companies is that, as intellectual property, trademarks are permitted to 
cross state lines without violating federal drug trafficking laws. Thus, a 
trademark can be used in interstate commerce by being used in more than 
one state without ever violating federal law. As of the writing of this 
                                                     
 112. See MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 19:8. These rights and privileges include nationwide 
enforcement and a presumption of constructive use. Id. § 16:5. 
 113. Id. § 19:3. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See McCallion, supra note 9. 
 116. Miriam D. Trudell, Marijuana in the U.S.—Some States Let You Smoke It, But You Can’t 
Register a Trademark for It at the USPTO, 70 INTA BULL. 7 (2015). 
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 118. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2010). 
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prior to federal registration of a confusingly similar trademark. See MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 16:17. 
 120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining “use in commerce”). 
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Comment, forty-five states, plus the District of Columbia, Guam, and 
Puerto Rico, have some type of statute that allows for use of medical 
marijuana.121 In theory, this means that a producer of medical marijuana 
could license its trademark to another producer in up to forty-seven other 
jurisdictions.122 The nascent market is continuing to grow nationwide, and 
producers of medical marijuana, who have created valuable, effective 
medicine, have a strong interest in protecting their brand from less 
effective imposters who are hoping to free ride off their goodwill. 
CONCLUSION 
Allowing federal registration of medical marijuana trademarks is one 
step in helping consumers make safe and informed decisions about their 
medicine. The parents of children that benefit from the use of medical 
marijuana-based products will be confident they are providing their 
children with safe, reliable medicine. A federally registered medical 
marijuana trademark will also reduce transaction costs for consumers that 
may be purchasing medicine from various states by eliminating the time-
consuming research that they will be forced to do if they cannot rely on a 
product’s trademark as an identification of its source. 
The culture surrounding and the attitude toward medical marijuana 
is shifting. The USPTO’s policies should reflect this shift, and they should 
serve to both benefit consumers and protect patients. The USPTO did not 
make a mistake when it created the category of identification for medical 
marijuana in 2010. Rather, the USPTO was acting within the statutory 
authority of the Lanham Act to accept applications for these types of 
trademarks. The USPTO was not permitted to prohibit registration of 
trademarks for products that may be in violation of federal law. In light of 
the varying interpretations of lawful use in commerce, the USPTO should 
permit registration of trademarks related to medical marijuana-based 
products. 
 
                                                     
 121. Medical Marijuana, NORML, http://norml.org/legal/medical-marijuana-2 [https://perma.cc/ 
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 122. The nuances of trademark licensing as it relates to medical marijuana laws are beyond the 
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